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Abstract
This study presents a modified version of the repeated discounted prisoners’ dilemma
with long and short-run players. In our setting a short-run player does not observe the
history that has occurred before he was born, and survives into next phases of the game
with a probability given by the current action profile in the stage game. Thus, even though it
is improbable, a short-run player may live and interact with the long-run player for infinitely
long amounts of time. In this model we prove that under a mild incentive condition on the
stage game payoffs, the cooperative outcome path is not subgame perfect no matter how
patient the players are. Moreover with an additional technical assumption aimed to provide
a tractable analysis, we also show that payoffs arbitrarily close to that of the cooperative
outcome path, cannot be obtained in equilibrium even with patient players.
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1 Introduction
The analysis of the discounted repeated prisoners’ dilemma reveals that cooperation can be
obtained when players are sufficiently patient. Moreover, the perfect Folk Theorem of Fudenberg
and Maskin (1986) shows that this conclusion holds for any strictly individually rational payoff.
However, assuming that one of the players is short lived changes these conclusions drastically as
is pointed out in Fudenberg, Kreps, and Maskin (1990). In fact, in the framework of repeated
prisoners’ dilemma this assumption reduces the set of equilibrium outcomes to the repetition of
the non-cooperative action.
In this study we consider a repeated prisoners’ dilemma with a long-run player (player 1),
and countably many short run players. In order to provide an easier reading, we describe the
model thinking of a soccer club, where player 1 is the owner of the club and the short run players,
the coaches. Time is discrete, and every period a coach is born and we refer to a coach born in
period t by player (2.t). In the first period, player 1 faces player (2.1), and they both choose an
action in {C,D}. Then, in the same period a public signal in {0, 1} is realized, where 0 is to
be interpreted as failure and 1 to be success. The probability distribution on the set of public
signals is determined by the action profile chosen in that period. In case of failure, they both
receive zero payoffs and coach (2.t) gets fired, and in the next period player 1 faces coach (2.2).
On the other hand, in case of success, they receive the prisoners’ dilemma payoffs (all strictly
positive) and coach (2.1) does not get fired, and is active also in period 2. Thus, in any period
t, player 1 may face (with some probabilities) any one of players (2.τ), τ ≤ t. We assume that
a coach born in period t dies in that period when he is not employed. A t length history in this
setting is given by t actions and t public signal, all of which player 1 observes. But player (2.τ)
τ ≤ t, does not observe the history (both public and private) before his birth, but the t− τ tail
of a t length history (we work with the convention that the 0 tail of any history is the empty
set). All the players discount future payoffs, but not necessarily with the same discount rate.
We show that when payoffs from short run deviations are sufficiently high, sustaining coop-
eration turns out to be impossible even with patient players. In particular, this study proves
that when short run deviation payoffs are sufficiently high, then the cooperative outcome path
(which consists of the cooperative action regardless of failures and successes) is not subgame
perfect for any discount factor. Moreover, we also show that payoffs arbitrarily close to that of
the cooperative outcome path cannot be obtained in equilibrium even with patient players. The
main reason of this observation is that, when cooperation is considered a deviation by player 1
is more difficult to be punished because: (1) a coach born in period t must cooperate on the first
day that he is active (note that such players do not observe that player 1 has deviated in the
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past), and (2) only coaches who faced a deviation by player 1 and became successful are able to
punish him.
While our result can be immediately used to provide a simple explanation for why soccer
coaches get fired very frequently1, an important application includes an infinitely repeated version
Kyle’s market model, due to Kyle (1989), with a long run and many short run traders, where all
are informed.
In a simple repeated version of Kyle’s model2 with long and short run players, we imagine
that the stage game involves 3 players: Two informed traders, first one is the long run informed
investor and the second is the short run informed investor, and a market maker.3 Indeed, while
the first player can be thought of as an investor with high job security, the second player can be
viewed as a fresh graduate from good economics/business programs who was hired as a trader, but
his job is not secure and his continued employment critically depends on his performance (in the
short run). We, consider the situation where the information rent of the investors depend on their
actions which only take 2 values, high (defection) or low (cooperation). Another simplification
that needs to be done is to assume that the market maker is myopic (discounts future returns
with discount rate of zero) and cannot condition his behavior on the past. He can identify the
real value of the asset with a probability which depends on the action choices of the two traders.
Indeed, when the market maker identifies the real value of the asset, it can be considered as a
failure for the two traders and in this case they obtain zero excess returns. Moreover in this
contingency the short run informed investor loses his job, and is replaced by another in the next
period. On the other hand, if the market maker cannot identify the real value of the asset, then
the excess return that the informed traders obtain (the information rent) depends again on their
action choices, and is in the form of a standard prisoners’ dilemma. Furthermore, in this state of
the world, particular short run informed investor continues to be employed in the next period.
Our results then imply that even with patient investors, cooperation can not be obtained
when deviations in the short run are sufficiently beneficial.
1It is appropriate to point out that in the first 10 weeks of the 2007-2008 season of the Turkcell Superlig (the
Premiere Turkish Soccer League) 10 coaches have been fired.
2Kyle’s Market Model is a one shot financial economics model for asset pricing in which there are four parties
involved in the trade of an asset. The real value of the asset is only known to one of these traders, the informed
trader, while the other uninformed but rational player is trying guess the value from the total demand for this
asset in order to maximize his returns. The third party involved is the noise trader (also called hedger) who is
not rational, and has to demand some random amount of this asset, and this provides noise into the model. The
final player is the market maker, who does not observe the real value of the asset (and hence is uninformed),
and tries to get the efficiency of the market by determining the price based on the total demand he observes.
In the equilibrium of this model, the informed trader achieves a surplus, which can be thought as a rent for his
information.
3It needs to be mentioned that we do not have an uninformed but rational player and the noise traders.
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It needs to be emphasized that restricting a player 2 born in period t > 1 not to observe
histories (actions and public signals) prior to his birth is an important one. Indeed, the formula-
tion with player (2.t) being able to observe the public signals (but not past action profiles) prior
to his birth is more appealing. We need to say that it is not known to us whether or not some
versions of our result can be extended to such situations. On the other hand, such endeavors
are not trivial. Consider player (2.t) being able to observe the public signals that has occurred
before his birth, and to see some implications and related complications consider the following
strategy: On the first day he is born, he cooperates if the public signals are all consisting of
1’s (i.e. the past has been nothing but success); otherwise, he defects. And, in later periods
he cooperates only when player 1 cooperated in the periods that are observable to player (2.t);
otherwise, he defects. With this strategy a deviation of player 1 from the cooperative path can
be punished more effectively, because his deviation would increase the probability of failure, and
thus, the probability of his deviation being punished by a player 2 who was born in a period
after player 1’s deviation. Thus, a general formulation with player (2.t), t > 1 observing public
signals in periods τ = 1, . . . , t−1, would call for checking whether or not we can adopt techniques
presented in Abreu, Pearce, and Stachetti (1990), and analyzing equilibrium payoffs.
The analysis of the repeated prisoners’ dilemma has always been one of the cornerstones in the
literature. Our analysis differs from the standard (complete information) versions in the following
ways: As in Fudenberg, Kreps, and Maskin (1990) and Fudenberg and Levine (2006) our model
features short and long-run players with the important distinction that short-run players may
survive with some probability into future phases of the game. Moreover, the second important
difference is the additional restriction that short-run players do not observe the history prior to
their birth. In that regard, our setup shares some similarities with the analysis of limited memory
in the context of the repeated prisoners’ dilemma with complete information and long-run players.
We refer the reader to Aumann (1981), Neyman (1985), Rubinstein (1986), Kalai and Stanford
(1988), Sabourian (1998), Barlo, Carmona, and Sabourian (2008), and Barlo and Carmona (2007)
for more on the subject. On the other hand, Cole and Kocherlakota (2005) delivers a similar
conclusion to ours in the context of a repeated prisoners’ dilemma with imperfect monitoring and
finite memory: They prove that for some parameter settings the only strongly symmetric public
perfect equilibrium consists of the repetition of the non-cooperative action profile regardless of
the discount factor. Meanwhile, other studies of the repeated prisoners’ dilemma with imperfect
monitoring include Bashkar and Obara (2002), Mailath and Morris (2002), Mailath, Obara, and
Sekiguchi (2002), and Piccione (2002).
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2 The Model
We consider a similar game to the partnership game of Radner, Myerson, and Maskin (1986).
Every period, a long-run (infinitely lived) player, henceforth to be referred to as the first player,
is interacting with one of countably many short-run players. Every period a short-run player is
born, and the one born in period t will be referred to as player (2.t).
The period interaction is a modified version of the standard prisoners’ dilemma: each action
profile in A ≡ {C,D}× {C,D} is followed by a public signal θ in {0, 1}, where θ = 1 signals the
“success” of the interaction between player 1 and 2 in period t. When θ = 0, both agents do not
obtain any payoffs from their interaction. Moreover, player (2.t′), t′ ≤ t that player 1 has played
against in period t, is “fired” and player 1 will interact with player (2.(t+1)) in the next period.
On the other hand, in case of success the players obtain the following payoffs:
C D
C (1, 1) (c, b)
D (b, c) (d, d)
(1)
where b > 1 > d > c > 0 and b+c
2
< 1. Moreover, then (2.t′), t′ ≤ t, is not to be fired and will be
the player 2 that player 1 will play against in period t+ 1.
We let Pr(θ = 0|CC) = p1, Pr(θ = 0|CD) = Pr(θ = 0|DC) = p2 and Pr(θ = 0|DD) = p3,
with 0 < p1 < p2 < p3 < 1. It is worthwhile to point out that the probability of success decreases
with defection.
Consequently, in period t players obtain the following (short-run) returns:
Pl1/P l(2.t′) C D
C (1− p1), (1− p1) (1− p2)c, (1− p2)b
D (1− p2)b, (1− p2)c (1− p3)d, (1− p3)d
for t′ ≤ t, where t′ is the period in which the player 2 that player 1 faces was born. In order
to ensure that the short-run payoffs is given by a prisoners’ dilemma, we have the following
assumption:
Assumption 1 (1−p2)b > (1−p1), (1−p3)d > (1−p2)c, (1−p1) > (1−p3)d, b > 1 > d > c > 0
and b+c
2
< 1.
We denote the set of histories by H, any t − 1 length history consists of signals and action
played up to t period,
ht = ((a1, θ1), (a2, θ2), ...., (at−1, θt−1)).
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Let f1 be the pure strategy of player 1 such that f1(ht) ∈ {C,D} for each period t. We denote
the set of all pure strategies of first player by F1.
The following assumption will play a critical role in our analysis:
Assumption 2 Assume that player (2.t), a second player born in period t, is restricted to use
pure strategies that do not depend on the history (both public and private) that has happened
before he was born.
Consequently, for any t′ ≥ t ≥ 1 and for any t′ − 1 length history h, let T t′−t(h) be the
t′ − t tail of h. That is, given that h = ((aτ , θτ )t′−1τ=1 ), T t′−t(h) ≡ ((aτ , θτ )t
′−1
τ=t ). Obviously, if
t′ = t, T 0(h) = e for all t′ − 1 length history h. We let f(2.t) be the pure strategy of player (2.t)
so that for any t′ ≥ t and ht′ any t′ − 1 length history, f(2.t)(ht′) : T t′−t(ht′) → {C,D}, thus,
f(2.t) = {f(2.t)(ht′)}t′≥t. Denote the set of all pure strategies for second players by F2.4
An outcome path pi = {pit}t∈N where for any t, pit = ((a1,t, a2,t), θt). We denote the set of
outcome paths by Π. Moreover, a strategy pair f = (f1, f2) induces the set of possible outcome
paths pi(f) ∈ A∞ ≡ A×A× . . . as follows: pi1(f) = ((f1(e), f(2.1)(e)), θ1). Note that if θ1 = 1, the
player 2 that player 1 faces in period 2 is (2.1). Thus, pi2(f) = (f1(a1, θ1), f(2.1)(a1, θ1), θ2). But,
if θ1 = 0, then player 1 faces player (2.2), thus, pi2(f) = (f1(a1, θ1), f(2.2)(e), θ2). An inductive
argument can be used to formalize pit(f) as above. To elaborate on this process formally, we
need to define the following function: For any t− 1 length history ht, let θt = (θ1, . . . , θt−1), and
define ι : {0, 1}t−1 → {1, . . . , t} by
ι(ht) =

τ if there exists t′ ≤ t− 1 with θt′ = 0,
and τ = argmax{t′′≤t}{t′′ : θt′′−1 = 0}
1 otherwise.
In words, ι(ht) = τ ∈ {2, . . . , t} if θτ−1 is the last 0 entry in θt, and ι(ht) = 1 if θt does not
contain any 0 entry. Thus, for any t − 1 length history ht, (2.ι(ht)) with ι(ht) ≤ t is the player
whom player 1 faces in period t. Thus, for any t ∈ N,
pit(f) =
((
f1({piτ (f)}t−1τ=1), f(2.ι({piτ (f)}t−1τ=1))(T
t−ι({piτ (f)}t−1τ=1))
)
, θt
)
.
Players discount future payoffs with the discount factor δi ∈ [0, 1), i ∈ {1} ∪ {(2.t) : t ∈ N}. In
4Note that since in period t′ the exact identity of the second player is one of ∪t′τ=1(2.τ) depending on previous
signals that are already included in the t′ − 1 length history ht′ . Thus, the birth-period of the particular second
player that player 1 faces in period t′, is already given by the history. Hence, the behavior of a second player
born in period t, for a t′ − 1 length history ht′ , with t′ ≥ t, is described by f(2.t)(ht′) : T t′−t(h)→ {C,D}.
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particular, for every given outcome path pi the payoffs are given by:
U1(pi) = (1− δ1)
∞∑
t=1
δt−11 u1(piτ ), (2)
U(2.t)(pi) =

(1− δ(2.1))(u2(pi1) if t = 1;
+
∑∞
τ=2 δ
τ−1
(2.1)
∏τ−1
k=1 Pr(θk = 1 | ak)u2(piτ ))
(1− δ(2.t))(u2(pit) if t > 1
+
∑∞
τ=t+1 δ
τ−t
(2.t)
∏τ−1
k=t Pr(θk = 1 | ak)u2(piτ )) and θt−1 = 0;
0 otherwise.
where ui(piτ ) = Pr(θτ = 1 | aτ )ui(aτ ), and ui(aτ ) is as given in the prisoners’ dilemma described
by equation 1.
3 A Non-Cooperation Result
Define the cooperative outcome path to be an outcome path pi such that pit = ((C,C), θt) for
any θt ∈ {0, 1} and t ∈ N. Notice that the cooperative outcome path calls for cooperation
independently of the signals.
In the following, we show that under Assumptions 1 and 2 and a condition on stage game
payoffs, the cooperative outcome path, cannot be supported as a Nash equilibrium for all δi ∈
[0, 1), i ∈ {1} ∪ {(2.t) : t ∈ N}.
Proposition 1 Suppose that
(1− p1)(1− p3)d+ p1(1− p2)b ≥ (1− p1). (3)
Then the cooperative outcome path pi is not Nash Equilibrium path for any δi ∈ [0, 1), i ∈
{1} ∪ {(2.t) : t ∈ N}.
Proof. Under the cooperative path pi, U1(pi) equals (1 − p1), because, U1(pi) = (1 −
δ1)
∑∞
t=1 δ
t−1
1 u1(pi
t), and u1(pi
t) = Pr(θt = 1 | at) = (1− p1), for every t ∈ N.
Next notice that any strategy of player (2, t), t ∈ N, inducing the cooperative outcome path
pi, must require player (2, t) to choose C if either t = 1, or t > 1 and θt−1 = 0. Let (f(2,t)t∈N) be
such a pure strategy profile. Define f ′1 be the strategy for the first player such that f
′
1(h
t) = D
for all ht and t. Then, below we show that
U1(f
′
1, f2) > (1− p1)(1− p3)d+ p1(1− p2)b.
This is because the payoff of player 1 in period t > 1 is greater or equal to (1−p1)u1(D,D)+
p1u1(D,C) = (1− p1)(1− p3)d+ p1(1− p2)b. Moreover, this relation holds with strict inequality
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when t = 1. This is because, Pr(θt−1 = 0 | at−1) ≥ p1 for all at−1 ∈ A, thus, Pr(θt−1 = 1 |
at−1) ≤ (1 − p1) for all t > 1; and, in the first period player 2 chooses C while player 1 goes
for D. Hence, U1(f
′
1, f2) > (1 − δ1)
∑∞
t=1 δ
t−1
1 (1 − p1)u1({D,D}) + p1u1({D,C}), showing that
U1(f
′
1, f2) > (1− p1)(1− p3)d+ p1(1− p2)b.
Because that
U1(f
′
1, f2) > (1− p1)(1− p3)d+ p1(1− p2)b ≥ (1− p1) = U1(f1, f2),
f ′1 defined as above is a profitable deviation for player 1 from the cooperative outcome path,
thus, the result follows.
The intuition behind this result is as follows: Due to Assumption 2, the strategies of the
short run players do not depend on the past histories (both public and private) before their
birth. Therefore, when the long run player, player 1, deviates from the cooperative outcome
path, he can be punished by only the short run player who experienced that deviation, and not
by short run players whom player 1 may face in the later phases of the game. Hence, condition 3
guarantees that no matter what the value of the discount factors are, player 1 cannot be punished
(because of his deviation from the cooperative path) effectively.
In the rest of this section, we analyze whether or not payoffs arbitrarily close to that of the
cooperative outcome path can be obtained in subgame perfection.
It is important to point out that for any player (2.t), t ∈ N, the constant outcome paths pia,
a ∈ {C,D}2, defined by piτa = (a, θτ ) for all τ ∈ N and θτ ∈ {0, 1}, deliver returns given by:
U(2.t)(piCC) =
(
1− p1
1− (1− p1)δ(2.t)
)
,
U(2.t)(piDC) =
(
1− p2
1− (1− p2)δ(2.t)
)
b,
U(2.t)(piCD) =
(
1− p2
1− (1− p2)δ(2.t)
)
c,
U(2.t)(piDD) =
(
1− p3
1− (1− p3)δ(2.t)
)
d.
Therefore, even with the normalization by multiplying period returns with (1−δ(2.t)), the returns
of player (2.t) from constant outcome paths depends on his discount factor δ(2.t). Consequently,
the following restriction helps to obtain a trackable analysis.
Assumption 3 Suppose that p1 = p2 = p3.
When assumption 3 holds, let p = p1 = p2 = p = 3 and for simplicity, we consider
U˜(2.t) =
(
1− δ(2.t) + δ(2.t)p
1− δ(2.t)
)
U(2.t),
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and because p ∈ (0, 1), U˜(2.t) is a linear transformation of U(2.t).
Then, U˜(2.t)(piCC) = (1− p), U˜(2.t)(piDC) = (1− p)b, U˜(2.t)(piCD) = (1− p)c, and U˜(2.t)(piDD) =
(1− p)d.
The following Proposition proves that payoffs sufficiently close to the one of the cooperative
outcome path cannot be obtained in subgame perfection.
Proposition 2 Suppose that Assumptions 1, 2, 3, and the condition given in inequality 3 hold.
Then there exists ε > 0 and δ¯1 < 1, such that for all ε
′ < ε, every payoff u = (u1, (u(2.t))t∈N) with
‖(u1, u(2.1)) − ((1 − p), (1 − p))‖ ≤ ε′, and ‖(u1, u(2.t)) − ((1 − p), p(1 − p))‖ ≤ ε′ for all t ∈ N,
cannot be obtained with a Nash equilibrium pure strategy profile for all δ1 ≥ δ¯1.
Proof. Let ε > 0 be sufficiently small so that ε <
(
1− b+c
2
)
, a condition needed in order to
use Assumption 1 in the following analysis.
Define rδ on {0, 1}∞ for δ ∈ [0, 1) by rδ(ζ) = (1 − δ)
∑
t∈N δ
t−1ζt, for ζ ∈ {0, 1}∞. Note
that rδ is continuous on {0, 1}∞, and {0, 1}∞ is compact (due to Tychonoff’s Theorem) with
the product topology. Moreover, it is clear that r·(ζ) is continuous for every δ ∈ [0, 1). Thus,
because that for all δ ∈ [0, 1), rδ(ζ) ∈ [0, 1], we have: For any δn → δ ∈ [0, 1) and ζn → ζ,
limn→∞ rδn(ζn) = rδ(ζ). Moreover, when δn tends to 1 and ζn → ζ, we have, limδn→1 rδn(ζn) =
lim infT→∞ 1T
∑T
t=1 ζt ≡ r(ζ), that is, the fraction of 1’s in ζ. This is because, (1) Theorem 7.9
of Rudin (1976) shows that rδn converges uniformly on r on {0, 1}∞ since limn rδn(ζ) = r(ζ) for
every ζ ∈ {0, 1}∞ and supζ∈{0,1}∞ |rδn(ζ) − r(ζ)| converges 0 as n tends to infinity. (2) because
rδn is a sequence of continuous functions converging uniformly to r on {0, 1}2, following the same
arguments needed to solve exercise 9 from chapter 7 of Rudin (1976), suffices to establish that
for any δn → 1 and ζn → ζ, limδn→1 rδn(ζn) = r(ζ).
For any given strategy profile f2 = {f(2.t)}t∈N, let ζ(f2) ∈ {0, 1}∞ be defined by
ζt(f2) =

1 if t = 1 and f(2.1)(e) = C,
or t > 1 and for any h with length t− 1 and θt−1 = 0, f(2.t)(h) = C,
0 otherwise.
Let ε′ < ε, and consider any payoff u = (u1, (u(2.t))t∈N) as described in the statement of the
Proposition. We restrict attention to strategy profiles f and δ ∈ [0, 1) with
∥∥(U δ1 (f)− U δ(2.t)(f))− (u1, u(2.t))∥∥ < ε′2 , (4)
for all t ∈ N.
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Consider a deviation for player 1, f ′1, in which player 1 chooses D independent of the past,
i.e. f ′1(h) = D for all h. Then,
U δ1 (f
′
1, f2) ≥ (1− δ)(1− p)
(
1ζ1(f2)=1u1(D,C) + 1ζ1(f2)=0u1(D,D)
)
(5)
+(1− δ)δ(1− p) ((1− p)u1(D,D) + p (1ζ2(f2)=1u1(D,C) + 1ζ2(f2)=0u1(D,D)))
+(1− δ)δ2(1− p)(((1− p)2 + p(1− p))u1(D,D) +(
1− ((1− p)2 + p(1− p))) (1ζ3(f2)=1u1(D,C) + 1ζ3(f2)=0u1(D,D)))
+ . . .
Note that in 5, the player 2 experiencing and surviving after player 1’s deviation, is choosing D.
If this were not the case, player 1’s deviation would be even more profitable. Moreover, because
for all t > 1, the probability of the opponent of the first player being born before the time period
t is given by (1−p)t−1+p(1−p)t−2+p(1−p)t−3+ . . .+p(1−p)t−(t−2)+p(1−p)t−(t−1) = (1−p),
inequality 5 is reduced to
U δ1 (f
′
1, f2) ≥ (1− δ)(1− p)
(
g1 + p
∞∑
t=2
δt−1gt
)
+ δ(1− p)2u1(D,D), (6)
where gt ≡ 1ζt(f2)=1u1(D,C) + 1ζt(f2)=0u1(D,D).
Due to Assumptions 1 and 3, rδ(ζ(f2)) increases to 1 in a continuous manner when ε → 0
and δ → 1 for f such that f satisfies inequality 4. Thus, the right hand side of inequality 6
tends to p(1− p)b+ (1− p)2d which is strictly greater than (1− p) due to the condition given in
inequality 3.
Thus, when ε→ 0 and δ → 1, for any strategy profile f satisfying 4, U δ1 (f ′1, f2) > U δ1 (f1, f2).
Hence, there exists ε > 0 and δ¯1 < 1 such that the conclusion of the Proposition holds, an
observation finishing the proof.
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